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THE MONOPOLY MYTH: A COMMENT ON THE PUBLIC
FUNDING OF SPORTS STADIUMS
JEFFREY STANDEN*

The argument against public funding of sports stadiums relies
on the dubious supposition that professional sports franchises are
monopolists.' The argument runs that these franchises, as monopolists, are able to extort2 favorable deals from cities and other local
governments on account of the market power they, and by extension their league, have over the staging of premier contests in their
sport. For example, although minor, foreign or off-season football
leagues do from time to time arise, no one would seriously argue at
this point in history that any football league poses a serious competitive threat to the National Football League ("NFL") in the staging
of professional football at its highest echelon. Thus, the NFL enjoys
a monopoly over the provision of premier professional football.
Any city or locality that wants to have an NFL franchise in its midst
will have to deal with this monopolist and will accordingly pay mo3
nopoly prices in the form of stadium deals or direct subsidy to attract and retain a franchise.
The conclusion that professional leagues in major American
team sports constitute monopolies reflects an unduly narrow view
of the market in which professional teams compete. Indeed, the
observation that the leagues have monopoly power over the number of franchises in their respective sport fails to identify the consumer market in which the monopoly power is supposed to exist.
* Professor of Law, Willamette University.
1. See Rodney Fort, Direct Democracy and the Stadium Mess, in Sports, Jobs &
Taxes: The Economic Impact of Sports Teams and Stadiums 149-50 (Roger G.Noll
& Andrew Zimbalist eds. 1997); Stadium Financing and Franchise Relocation Act of
1999: Hearingon S.952 Before the Sen. Comm. on the Judiciary,106th Cong. 38 (1999)
[hereinafter Hearing on S.952] (statement of Andrew Zimbalist) ("An economist
has no difficulty in identifying monopoly as the root of the problem."); ANDREW
ZIMBALIST, MAY THE BEST TEAM WIN: BASEBALL ECONOMICS AND PUBLIC POLICY

123-

24 (Brookings Institution Press 2003).
2. Hearingon S.952, supra note 1, at 11 (testimony of Senator Arlen Specter of
Pennsylvania) (terming franchise demands for subsidies as "legalized extortion");
see also id. at 31 (testimony of Jean B. Cryor, Maryland House of Delegates) ("Today, team owners are holding the baby captive and waiting for ransom.").
3. The state of Louisiana provides its two professional teams with direct yearly
cash payments to retain the teams. Louisiana Faces Saints, Hornets Payments, FoxSPORTS.COM,

http://msn.foxsports.com/nba/story/

9

205212/Louisiana-faces-

Saints,- Hornets-cash-payments?MSNHPHMA (last visited Mar. 27, 2009).
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Although the NFL may, as a practical matter, present the only game
in town to satisfy consumer demand for premier football, professional football itself comprises merely one participant in the highly
competitive consumer market in leisure and entertainment activities. Thus, the NFL and other professional leagues in fact compete
for market share against the many other products for which consumers spend their leisure budget.
The contention that sports contests are but one participant in
the larger market for leisure activities is supported by the economic
observations made by opponents of stadium funding. Their research has shown that consumption of sports has local substitute
goods. 4 Consumers may select from many local leisure options and
will trade consumption of professional sports for other pursuits,
such as recreation or restaurant dining. This "substitution effect"
forms the primary plank in the argument against public funding of
sports stadiums: because the arrival of a team merely shifts consumer spending among substitute goods and does not increase it,
then the claim that a new team will enhance business and economic
activity and profit the locality is false. Yet it is that very same ease of
substitution that renders the claim of monopoly dubious. The presence of substitutes indicates that the sports team does not supply all
the demand for leisure enjoyments. Fans will go elsewhere if prices
are too high. Teams will be unable to exercise the monopoly power
funding critics attribute to them. The team can set a price for its
goods, both to the fans and to the city, but in either case it runs the
risk of losing to the market competition.
The claim that the local sports team is a monopolist fails to
properly define the market in which sports teams compete. Nonetheless, although they are not true monopolists, sports teams do
appear to have some limited market power in their localities, for
instance when negotiating stadium deals, and on a national scale,
when negotiating broadcasting rights. This market power, although limited by the prerogative of fans, cities and television networks to substitute other leisure goods, does give the owners of
4. SeeJohn Siegfried & Andrew Zimbalist, The Economics of Sports Facilities and
OF ECON. PERSPECTIVES 95, 105 (2000).
The vast majority of consumers has a relatively inflexible leisure budget.
If a sports team moves to town, the money one spends taking a family to a
game typically is money that is not spent at a local bowling alley, golf
course, restaurant or theater. The net effect on spending in the metropolitan area then is zero, or very close to zero. While sports teams may
rearrange the spending and economic activity in an urban area, they are
not likely to add much to it.

Their Communities, 14J.
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sports teams an opportunity to extract limited rents from their advantageous position, thus giving franchises and leagues the appearance of monopolists.
Yet even as a monopolist in this limited sense, the sports team's
monopoly is probably a natural one. The major professional sports
teams in America have all the ingredients of a natural monopoly,
including very high fixed costs. The costs of constructing a venue
and hiring coaches and players constitute the large majority of the
costs of staging premier sporting events. These fixed costs are high
relative to the variable costs of producing contests: thus team owners could add dates to the schedule with little trouble. It should not
surprise that any monopoly by professional sports is natural: the salaries that must be paid to identify and attract the finest athletes to a
particular sport and team are very substantial. 5 A league limited to
the best athletes must in turn limit the number of teams. Although
competition is always possible, the repeated failures of rival sports
leagues have provided evidence that the exclusive premier status of
the current professional leagues is here to stay. In addition, the
consumption of sports presents the classic network effect: the more
fans who are interested in a particular league, the more those fans
enjoy their consumption of that league. Only a single, nationwide
sports league can take complete advantage of this network effect.
In response to this perceived monopoly, and without recognition that any such monopoly may be natural, opponents of public
funding of sports stadiums have offered a range of solutions, all
involving government intervention and control. The proposals include mandatory divestiture of the leagues into multiple, independent leagues, 6 enactment of federal law to prohibit stadium
subsidies 7 or other federal interventions. 8 The aim of these proposals is to eliminate the public subsidy.
5. To produce a contest between the very best athletes in any particular sport
requires a limitation in the number of athletes who may participate. A limitation
in the number of athletes necessarily connotes a limitation in the number of
teams. Thus, the only way to put on a contest involving the best athletes is to limit
the number of teams, even below the number that might supply the market-clearing number.
6. PAUL C. WIELER AND GARY R. ROBERTS, SPORTS AND THE LAW: TEXT, CASES,
PROBLEMS 736-38 (3d ed. 2004); Rodney Fort, Employment Effect of Teams and Sports
Facilities, in SPORTS, JOBS & TAXES: THE ECONOMIC IMPACT OF SPORTS TEAMS AND
STADIUMS, supra note 1, at 93.
7. See Marc Edelman, Sports and the City: How to Curb Professional Sports Teams'
Demands for Free Public Stadiums, 6 RUTGERS J. L. & PUB. POL'Y 45, 71-76 (2008).
8. One opponent has called for strict application of the historic "lending of
credit" and "public purpose" limitations on government aid to private enterprise.
See generally, Dale F. Rubin, Public Aid to Professional Sports Teams - A Constitutional
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What these proposals fail to consider is that the subsidy itself
may be the remedy for the perceived problem of monopolization.
For sports teams, the average cost of staging games reaches its
cheapest point at a quantity well above the number of games the
consumer of sports would likely demand. In other words, the fact
that the professional leagues limit the number of contests on their
schedule reflects, at least in part, their fear of over-saturating their
market.
At some point contests would become so numerous as to be
meaningless, and would accordingly lose fan interest. Teams in this
position, with all the necessary employees under salary and venues
available, will nonetheless decline to produce all the games they
could, because producing more games, although marginally
cheaper, would diminish fan interest and decrease revenue. 9 The
sports monopolist will restrict output so that the relatively infrequent contests will draw maximum fan interest. The locality, however, may want the team to produce more games than the
incentives for restricted monopoly output would suggest. Localities
benefit from frequent games, providing an additional entertainment choice and stirring up economic activity. Thus the public
subsidy, whether it comes in the form of cash or a funded stadium,
solves the problem of monopoly by inducing the leagues to stage a
greater number of home contests than they would have without the
subsidy. The subsidy essentially covers the putative loss that results
from staging the entire schedule.10
Although the better argument is that sports leagues do not
constitute a monopoly, at least not in the consumer market in
which they compete, it is certain that the leagues do enjoy a monopsony, the buyer's equivalent of a monopoly, in which only one
buyer may purchase a product. In practical terms, athletes have
Disgrace: The Battle to Revive JudicialRulings and State ConstitutionalEnactments Prohibiting Public Subsidies to Private Corporations,30 U. TOL. L. REV. 393 (1999).
9. This is not to say that teams could not be profitable without government
subsidy. SeeJAMES QuIRK & RODNEY FORT, HARD BALL: THE ABUSE OF POWER IN PRO
TEAM SPORTS 181-82 (Princeton University Press 1999) (arguing teams could be
profitable without subsidies). Rather, the point of profitability might be at an output well below a full season schedule. Losing teams, in particular, would likely
decline to play out the schedule, liquidating their assets instead. The public subsidy, typically exchanged for the promise of a full schedule of contests, allows the
losing team to guarantee salaries and produce games to satisfy the full season
schedule.
10. This solution to the problem of monopoly is not a common one, as it is
difficult to explain to voters why a government dedicated to the elimination of
monopolies should subsidize one. Yet this approach has been taken frequently
with respect to privately operated urban transit systems, for example.
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nowhere else to go should they not agree to a contract with the
league in their chosen sport. This monopsony position has generated repeated requests for judicial intervention at the behest of individual players to subject league practices and rules to antitrust
scrutiny.' 1 This monopsony has also given rise to players unions
and subsequent collective bargaining agreements. But the fact that
the leagues are monopsonists with respect to their players does not
mean that the leagues are monopolists for all purposes. Fans have
a choice and, as economic literature demonstrates, exercise that
choice with regularity. Demand is elastic, thus stifling attempts by a
professional sports franchise to extract monopoly profits. It is not
the only game in town.
Understanding the sports team as one producer in a multi-producer competitive market and not as a monopolist, renders the
other controversies involving stadium funding less difficult to resolve. The salient issue is the charge, made implicitly by opponents
of stadium financing, of fraudulent inducement. Opponents of stadium subsidies have relentlessly pointed out the dubiousness of the
claims made by team owners and other proponents in support of
stadium funding. Their arguments are convincing: every serious
study of the economics of funding sports stadiums concludes that
stadiums do not pay off. They do not fulfill their public promise of
12
providing enhanced business opportunities for local merchants;
they do not substantially contribute to the improvement of the
neighborhoods in which they are built; 13 and they do not provide
the general increased economic activity and financial profit for the
city or community in which they are built as a whole. 14 Finally, adding insult to injury, the construction of a new sports stadium is
11. See Flood v. Kuhn, 407 U.S. 258 (1972) (holding that exemption of professional baseball's reserve system from federal antitrust laws is established aberration
that Congress must remedy); Piazza and Tirendi v. Major League Baseball, 831 F.
Supp. 420 (E.D. Pa. 1993) (holding that baseball exemption to federal antitrust
laws does not extend beyond player reserve system); Smith v. Pro Football, Inc.,
593 F.2d 1173 (D.C. Cir. 1978) (holding that professional football player draft had
anticompetitive impact on market for players' services); Mackey v. Nat'l Football
League, 543 F.2d 606 (8th Cir. 1976) (holding that exemption to antitrust laws
could not be invoked where agreement with players was not product of bona fide
arm's length negotiations).
12. See Siegfried & Zimbalist, supra note 4, at 110.
13. See Todd Senkiewicz, Stadium and Arena Financing: Who Should Pay?, 8 SETON HALLJ. SPORT L.

575, 589 (1998).

14. See Robert A. Baade & Allen R. Sanderson, The Employment Effect of Teams

and Sports Facilities, in

SPORTS,

JoBs &

TAXES: THE ECONOMIC IMPACT OF SPORTS

STADIUMS, supra note 1, at 93 (concluding that spending on sports is
"largely offset by reductions in other forms of leisure spending by consumers and
other fiscal commitments by governmental entities").
TEAMS AND
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frequently cited as the reason, or the excuse, for substantial increases in the price of tickets.1 5 In essence, tax payers build stadiums that they may not visit and without offsetting benefit.
Despite the criticisms, once the issue of monopoly is set aside, a
surprisingly robust case can be made to support the public funding
of private sports stadiums. Cities bid for teams in a market that is
competitive, and they bid voluntarily. City managers should be presumed to spend taxpayers' money validly. Although the price they
must pay is high, the price is unavoidably steep. Teams compete in
the entertainment market, and thus have to provide an experience
to induce fans to pay high prices to support the large salaries
needed to encourage young athletes to sacrifice their youth to the
pursuit of sport. Playing careers tend to be brief; salaries must be
commensurately high. The contemporary fan experience includes
winning teams and exciting stadium venues. Further, the good that
the city pays to supply is in part public. Fan enjoyment of a team is
non-excludable and non-rivalrous: many fans are ardent in their
support of the home town team yet seldom attend games in person.
In other words, fans can enjoy the team but the owner of the team
cannot extract payment for their consumption. These non-attending fans may pay teams indirectly, by watching television advertisements or purchasing some merchandise, but this payment is likely
insufficient to account for their consumption. The balance is paid
by the city. Like any public good, the lack of a public subsidy would
cause the good to be under-produced.
15. These higher ticket prices are very controversial, yet defensible. The new
stadium typically should supply better seating. Thus, the fan in the new stadium is
in theory receiving a superior product. Further, the higher ticket price should not
necessarily be attributed to the new stadium. The cost of attracting and retaining
the best players for the local franchise typically increases over time. Thus, the new
stadium is not the reason for the increase in ticket prices, but, rather, is the vehicle
by which higher revenues can be raised. The higher revenues are needed to field
a competitive team. Of course, a cogent argument can be made that the hike in
ticket prices stemming from a new stadium is illusory. If the team had it within its
power to command higher ticket prices, then it would do so prior to the completion of the new stadium.
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